Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial by Diana Menya et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Using pay for performance incentives (P4P)
to improve management of suspected
malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster
randomized controlled trial
Diana Menya1, Alyssa Platt2, Imran Manji3, Edna Sang3, Rebeccah Wafula3, Jing Ren2, Olympia Cheruiyot3,
Janice Armstrong4, Brian Neelon5 and Wendy Prudhomme O’Meara1,2,5*
Abstract
Background: Inappropriate treatment of non-malaria fevers with artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) is
a growing concern, particularly in light of emerging artemisinin resistance, but it is a behavior that has proven
difficult to change. Pay for performance (P4P) programs have generated interest as a mechanism to improve health
service delivery and accountability in resource-constrained health systems. However, there has been little experimental
evidence to establish the effectiveness of P4P in developing countries. We tested a P4P strategy that emphasized
parasitological diagnosis and appropriate treatment of suspected malaria, in particular reduction of unnecessary
consumption of ACTs.
Methods: A random sample of 18 health centers was selected and received a refresher workshop on malaria case
management. Pre-intervention baseline data was collected from August to September 2012. Facilities were
subsequently randomized to either the comparison (n = 9) or intervention arm (n = 9). Between October 2012 and
November 2013, facilities in the intervention arm received quarterly incentive payments based on seven performance
indicators. Incentives were for use by facilities rather than as payments to individual providers. All non-pregnant
patients older than 1 year of age who presented to a participating facility and received either a malaria test or
artemether-lumefantrine (AL) were eligible to be included in the analysis. Our primary outcome was prescription
of AL to patients with a negative malaria diagnostic test (n = 11,953). Our secondary outcomes were prescription
of AL to patients with laboratory-confirmed malaria (n = 2,993) and prescription of AL to patients without a malaria
diagnostic test (analyzed at the cluster level, n = 178 facility-months).
Results: In the final quarter of the intervention period, the proportion of malaria-negative patients in the
intervention arm who received AL was lower than in the comparison arm (7.3 % versus 10.9 %). The improvement
from baseline to quarter 4 in the intervention arm was nearly three times that of the comparison arm (ratio of
adjusted odds ratios for baseline to quarter 4 = 0.36, 95 % CI: 0.24–0.57). The rate of prescription of AL to patients
without a test was five times lower in the intervention arm (adjusted incidence rate ratio = 0.18, 95 % CI: 0.07–0.48).
Prescription of AL to patients with confirmed infection was not significantly different between the groups over the
study period.
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Conclusions: Facility-based incentives coupled with training may be more effective than training alone and could
complement other quality improvement approaches.
Trial registration: This study was registered with ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT01809873) on 11 March 2013.
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Background
Overtreatment of fevers with antimalarials is a major
global health challenge that has been described across
malaria-endemic countries around the world. In devel-
oping countries, in a typical rural health center, more
than 90 % of febrile patients are treated with antimalar-
ials when a diagnostic test is not available [1] and even
when testing is available, 40–80 % of patients with a
negative malaria test still receive an antimalarial [2–9].
Nationwide in Kenya, 20 million treatment courses of
artemether-lumefantrine (AL, the first-line antimalarial
in Kenya) were dispensed through government health
facilities in 2009, compared to only 9 million cases of
reported malaria.
Overuse of antimalarials poses a significant health risk
to both present and future patients and puts a financial
strain on the health system. Unnecessary consumption
jeopardizes the useful therapeutic life of first-line therap-
ies by accelerating the spread of drug resistance [10, 11]
and threatens the sustainability of donor-subsidized drug
procurement programs.
Since 2010, both the Government of Kenya and the
World Health Organization (WHO) [12] recommend
diagnostic testing before treatment with antimalarials, but
this recommendation is often ignored in practice. In the
current system in Kenya, as in many countries in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, there is little or no incentive for the pa-
tient or the clinician to adhere to the test-then-treat
policy for malaria. Antimalarials are free to the facility
and to the patient, whereas antibiotics are often dispensed
for a small fee. In addition, laboratory diagnosis of malaria
costs the patient $0.50 USD, more than it costs to buy
subsidized first-line antimalarials such as AL over the
counter in a retail shop. This combination of perverse
incentives contributes to the overtreatment of fevers with
antimalarials and poor compliance with the test-then-treat
policy.
Presumptive treatment of fevers with antimalarials is an
example of systemically poor provider behavior that may
be amenable to change using pay for performance (P4P)
incentives. Such extrinsic incentives could overcome the
perverse incentive structure described above. Performance-
based incentives have an established role in health care de-
livery in the developed world and have been implemented
extensively [13–16]. However, there is limited evidence to
support such incentive programs in health systems of
developing countries. A handful of studies have shown
promise, but methodologically rigorous evaluation of P4P,
particularly experimental evidence from randomized trials,
is lacking [17–23].
We tested a novel strategy to introduce facility-based
incentives in order to increase diagnostic testing, improve
appropriateness of prescription practices and increase
adherence to malaria diagnostic test results. There are
key differences in our P4P strategy compared to previ-
ous approaches. First, previous P4P approaches in Africa
emphasized volume of patients receiving specific services,
whereas our incentives are focused around quality of mal-
aria case management. Second, we used facility-directed
incentives rather than payments to individual providers,
thereby supporting health system infrastructure and em-
phasizing the teamwork required across the departments
(laboratory, pharmacy, records and clinical services) for
good case management.
We describe the results of a cluster randomized con-
trolled trial to measure the impact of facility-directed P4P
incentives to improve management of malaria in rural
health facilities. The intervention was targeted to the
health facility, therefore a cluster design using the
health facility as the unit of randomization was chosen.
We report the impact of incentives on three key outcomes,
the first two at the individual level and the third at the clus-
ter level: 1) inappropriate treatment of malaria-negative
patients with artemisinin-based combination therapies
(ACTs); 2) appropriate treatment of confirmed malaria
cases with ACTs; and 3) laboratory testing before treat-
ment with ACTs.
Methods
Study setting and facility enrollment
The study was carried out within the catchment area of
the Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare
(AMPATH), which includes 17 districts in the former
Western Province and northern Rift Valley Province1 of
Kenya. Malaria endemicity varies across the study area:
the Western Province experiences high transmission,
whereas the Rift Valley has little or no transmission but is
prone to epidemics when climate conditions are suitable.
The unit of enrollment and randomization was the
health center. Selection of facilities occurred in two
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phases: 1) random sampling to identify 18 eligible facil-
ities; and 2) random assignment of the sampled facilities
to the two arms (Fig. 1). All government-owned health
centers in the 17 districts were eligible for the study if they
had capacity to parasitologically diagnose malaria. Only
government health facilities were eligible, since only gov-
ernment facilities receive Health Sector Services Funds
(HSSF). Hospitals were not included because they receive
referrals and severe or complicated cases and their HSSF
allocation is much higher than lower-level facilities, all of
which could affect the response to the intervention.
There were 61 eligible health centers; 18 were selected
by simple random sampling. We chose facilities by simple
random sampling rather than probability proportional to
size because our intention was to describe facility behavior
from a representative sample of facilities, not the under-
lying patient population attending facilities. Nine facilities
were from areas designated by the Division of Malaria
Control as high transmission; the remaining were from
low epidemic-prone areas [24]. One facility was dropped
from the study after a prolonged absence of the laboratory
technician. Although it was eligible at enrollment, the
technician was absent for 2.5 of the first 4 months and
eventually fired in month 6. They were no longer able to
offer diagnostic testing and therefore were not able to
complete the study.
At the time the study was initiated, malaria rapid diag-
nostic tests (RDTs) were not available in government
facilities. Therefore, we focused on facilities that could
confirm suspected malaria by microscopy. We deemed
it unethical to emphasize withholding antimalarials from
malaria-negative patients without ensuring that the quality
of diagnosis was sufficiently high. One laboratory techni-
cian from each facility attended a training course at the
Fig. 1 Diagram of study enrollment, randomization and analysis
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Malaria Diagnostic Center in Kisumu, Kenya [25]. In
order to monitor quality of diagnosis, all study facilities
participated in a monthly external quality assurance pro-
gram, the details of which can be found in Wafula et al.
[26]. Sensitivity and specificity of malaria diagnosis was
included as a performance indicator for intervention
facilities.
Dissemination of the National Guidelines for the Diag-
nosis, Treatment and Prevention of Malaria in Kenya
[27] by the Division of Malaria Control began in late
2010 and included training and distribution of job aides.
It was important to ensure that the government malaria
treatment policies were reviewed with study facilities to
avoid the perception that ‘test-then-treat’ guidelines were
specific to our study. Therefore, the guidelines were
reviewed in a brief 1-day workshop prior to randomization
to arms.
Randomization to intervention arm
Following training, enrolled facilities were randomly al-
located to the two arms. Assignment was performed in an
open forum with attendees from each clinic and district
and a representative from the Division of Malaria Control.
Randomization was done by blinded draw where each fa-
cility within a district had an equal probability of alloca-
tion to either arm [28].
Incentive intervention
We tested the use of facility-directed, performance-
based incentives to improve quality of care for suspected
malaria fevers. Facilities in the intervention arm received
incentive payments based on seven performance indicators.
Performance indicators, and the value assigned to each in-
dicator and performance level, are shown in Table 1. They
included recording of patient identification numbers,
quality of laboratory diagnosis and clinician adherence
to the laboratory diagnosis. The incentives were designed
to foster cooperation between departments (pharmacy,
laboratory and clinical care) and none were punitive.
Spending of the incentive funds was subject to certain
restrictions according to the requirements of the gov-
ernment’s HSSF: they could only be used by the facility
for equipment, supplies, repairs and basic labor [29]; and
not for payments to individual clinicians or employees.
Harmonization of the incentive program and the HSSF
was critical for establishing whether P4P could be incor-
porated into the HSSF.
Incentive amounts were calculated and communicated
quarterly during routine facility visits. Facilities could earn
a maximum of $1,175 USD per quarter (100,000 KSh).
This amount was estimated to be approximately equivalent
to the amount of money that could be saved if overuse of
ACT was curbed. After communication of the incentive
amount earned, facilities submitted a budget to use
their incentive allocation and the study team executed
the budget. Supplies and equipment were procured by
the study team and delivered to the facility. Funds were
disbursed for repairs, construction or labor costs. Every
effort was made to disburse incentive funds within
4 weeks.
Data collection
Data were collected during monthly visits from August
2012 until November 2013 (pre-intervention baseline
data from September 2012 to October 2012, intervention
period from October 2012 to November 2013). A mem-
ber of the District Health Management Team (DHMT)
Table 1 Indicators for calculating incentives, weights and values
assigned to performance levels
Indicator Weight Scale
1 Percent of laboratory registry entries
with patient number (all patients)
5 % 100 % - full marks
>90 % - 60/100
>85 % - 50/100
<85 % - 0/100
2 Percent of AL registry entries with
patient number (all patients)
2.5 % 100 % - full marks
>90 % - 60/100
>85 % - 50/100
<85 % - 0/100
3 Percent of antibiotic registry entries
with patient number (all patients)
2.5 % 100 % - full marks
>90 % - 60/100
>85 % - 50/100
<85 % - 0/100




5 Percent of patients given AL without
a malaria test (slide or RDT)
30 % <5 % - full marks
5–10 % - 70/100
11–20 % - 50/100
>20 % - 0
6 Percent of patients with a positive
malaria test given AL
15 % 100 % - full marks
>90 % - 70/100
>80 % - 50/100
>70 % - 25/100
<70 % - 0/100
7 Percent of patients with a negative
malaria test given AL
25 % <5 % - full marks
5–10 % - 70/100
11–20 % - 50/100
>20 % - 0
The scale indicates what percent of the money for that indicator is awarded at
each performance level. For example, if less than 100 % but at least 90 % of
patient records had a patient number, then 60 % of the money for that
indicator was awarded. AL, artemether-lumefantrine; RDT, rapid diagnostic test
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accompanied the data collection team on all facility
visits. Data were collected by capturing electronic im-
ages of standard, government-issued facility registers in
use at all the facilities. A patient’s data were eligible for
inclusion in the study if they either: 1) had a laboratory
test for malaria; or 2) received AL. AL is the only ACT
available in government health facilities. Infants and
pregnant women are often prescribed quinine, therefore
women who were seen in antenatal clinic or otherwise
indicated as pregnant, and children less than 1 year of
age were excluded. This allowed us to focus specifically
on AL prescription.
Our sample was based on a systematic random sam-
pling of patients tested for malaria with either micros-
copy or RDT (the latter were sporadically available in
some facilities after the third month of the intervention).
The appropriate sampling interval ‘n’ was calculated based
on the number of malaria tests performed that month and
the expected proportion of children and negative tests.
We sampled every nth patient from the laboratory register
resulting in a sample of 26 malaria-negative children per
month per facility (see sample size calculation below) and
a variable number of adults and slide-positive patients de-
pending on the proportion of malaria-negative children
seen at the facility.
Each patient sampled from the laboratory register was
then traced in the clinical register and the pharmacy reg-
isters (antibiotics register and AL register) to determine
which diagnoses were assigned and which drugs were
prescribed. Drug prescriptions were taken from both the
pharmacy register and clinical register due to incomplete
pharmacy record keeping in some facilities. In addition,
AL registers were reviewed and 6–7 random days each
month were matched to the laboratory register to deter-
mine which patients received AL without visiting the
laboratory.
Antimalarial drug stocks were monitored throughout
the study. The study was prepared to provide AL to any
facility in either arm with a shortage. AL was provided
to two facilities in mid-2013 for a 1-month window.
There were no stockouts in any study facilities.
Monthly facility reports were downloaded from the
Kenya Health Information System [30]. Missing data was
supplemented with copies of monthly reports kept at the
facility when possible.
Power and analysis
We calculated power to estimate our primary endpoint
in an important subgroup (children under 5 years of
age). We based our calculation on a cluster randomized,
difference-of-proportions test with the primary outcome
being the proportion of slide-negative patients receiving
AL at the end of the intervention period. Based on data
from a representative facility, we estimated that an average
facility would see 300 sick children per month, at least
30 % of which would be tested for malaria and 50–90 %
test negatively. If 50 % of slide-negative children in the
control arm receive AL, then 18 facilities (nine per arm)
with 26 slide-negative children per facility would give
90 % power to detect a minimum difference of 0.15 in the
proportion of negative children receiving AL. We assumed
a two-sided test with a 95 % significance level and an
intracluster correlation (ICC) of 0.002. Assuming an ICC
of 0.005 reduced our power slightly to 88 %. We intended
to analyze the data longitudinally in order to identify a
burn-in phase or changes in response to the incentives
over time, therefore we planned to sample approximately
26 slide-negative children per facility in each of the
13 months of the study (1 month of baseline plus
12 months of intervention), for a total of 6,084 observa-
tions of children under 5 years of age with a negative test.
We powered our study to measure the outcomes in
children because, prior to the revised 2010 malaria treat-
ment guidelines, national policy advised treating children
less than 5 years of age presumptively with antimalarials
for any fever. The guidelines issued in 2010 changed the
policy to parasitological confirmation before treatment
for all age groups, including children under 5 years of
age. We expected that ‘test-then-treat’ guidelines would
not be adopted very readily for this age group and thus
could be a behavior that was amenable to change under
extrinsic incentives. However, the largest proportion of
wasted ACTs (ACTs given to slide-negative patients)
occurs in adults. Therefore, both age categories were
important for the study.
For the primary endpoint of AL prescription to malaria-
negative patients, we used a mixed-effects logistic regres-
sion model of individual patients with random intercepts
for each facility. The effect of time on the outcome and
interaction with the intervention was modeled using
dummy variables for baseline and each quarter. This
was chosen based on model fit and interpretability, since
the intervention incentives were calculated quarterly.
Covariates incorporated into the final model included
age group (<5 years and ≥5 years of age) and gender of
the patient, average volume of slides read in the facility
in the previous year, use of RDT or slide for diagnosis,
and location in a high or low transmission zone. We
used the same approach to evaluate our secondary end-
point of AL prescription to slide-positive patients.
ICC is reported for each model. ICC was also calcu-
lated for the comparison between the arms at the final
time point (month 12) to provide an estimate more com-
parable to our power calculation. These are provided as
supplementary material (Additional file 1).
An important secondary endpoint was the rate of AL
prescriptions to patients without a malaria test. This
endpoint was evaluated at the cluster level. The number
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of AL prescriptions dispensed to patients without a test
was calculated for each facility in each month of the
study. The effect of the intervention on AL prescribed to
untested patients was estimated with a negative binomial
regression model of the number of patients prescribed
AL without a test, with an offset equal to the log of the
total patient volume.
Finally, we calculated the difference in risk differences
from baseline to quarter 4 between the intervention and
control arms using results from the unadjusted mixed-
effects model assuming that random effects are zero
(Additional file 2).
Funding and ethical review
This study was supported by the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) (R21 AI095979). The protocol
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tional Research and Ethics Committee (IREC/2012/18
approval # 000804). Permission and participation of the
Ministry of Health and the Division of Malaria Control
was secured prior to the initiation of the study. Consent
was sought from the Provincial Health Management Teams
(Western Province and Rift Valley Province), each DHMT
and the officer in charge of each study facility.
Results
Study facilities
All study activities took place between June 2012 and
December 2013. Baseline data was collected in September
and October 2012. The intervention was launched in
October 2012 and continued until October 2013.
In total, 18 facilities were enrolled and 17 facilities
(nine intervention and eight comparison) completed the
1-year intervention phase of the study. One facility was
excluded from the analysis due to extended absence of a
laboratory technologist and inability to provide laboratory
diagnosis of malaria. The remaining facilities completed
the study and were included in the analysis (Fig. 1).
Overall, 14,721 patient encounters (including 5,584 slide-
negative children aged 1–5 years) were included in the
patient-level analysis.
There were no significant differences in demographics
of the patients attending facilities or the slide positivity
rate in each arm (Table 2). Comparison facilities had higher
baseline patient volume in the laboratory than intervention
facilities, but the difference was not statistically significant
(P = 0.24).
Impact of interventions on facility performance
Raw proportions, unadjusted odds ratios (ORs) and ad-
justed ORs from the mixed-effects logistic regression model
for the prescription of AL to malaria-negative and malaria-
positive patients in quarter 4 compared to baseline are
shown in Table 3. Full model results including coefficients
of all covariates can be found in Additional file 3.
By the final quarter of the intervention period, prescrip-
tion of AL to malaria-negative patients in the intervention
arm dropped from 22.4 % at baseline to 7.3 % (112/1,526)
in quarter 4 compared to a decline of only 5.4 percentage
points in the intervention arm (16.3 % to 10.9 %). After
correcting for individual and facility covariates, the odds
of receiving AL following a negative test in the interven-
tion arm was 0.15 in quarter 4 compared to baseline and
0.42 in the comparison arm relative to baseline, indicating
a larger improvement in the intervention arm over the
study period. This translates to a 2.75-fold greater reduc-
tion in odds of inappropriate prescription of AL in the
intervention arm relative to the comparison arm from
baseline to the end of the study.
Facilities in high transmission areas had ten times higher
odds of AL prescription to negative patients than those in
low transmission areas (adjusted OR = 10.36, 95 % CI:
4.96–21.64; Additional file 3), therefore we further strati-
fied our analysis on transmission zone (Table 3). Interven-
tion and comparison facilities in low malaria transmission
areas had equally low rates of AL prescription to malaria-
negative patients by the end of the study period, but inter-
vention facilities improved more relative to baseline than
comparison facilities. In high transmission areas, facilities
in both arms dispensed AL to 35 % of malaria-negative
patients at baseline. By the end of the study, interven-
tion facilities again showed more improvement than
Table 2 Facility and patient characteristics in each arm
Characteristics Intervention (n = 9) Comparison (n = 8)
Facility
High transmission 5 of 9 4 of 8
Number of clinical staff at
baseline (median, range)
6 (3–11) 7 (4–9)
Number of laboratory staff
at baseline (median, range)
1.5 (1–3) 1 (1–2)
Average slides read per
month (SD)
240.0 (126.9–353.1) 372.4 (135.0–609.7)
Percent positive slides 17.5 % (0.7–27.8) 19.1 % (1.3–28.0)
Percent of diagnoses
by RDT
12.3 % (1.3–45.5) 11.1 % (0.0–47.4)
Sensitivity (SD) 93.70 (89.04–98.35) 99.47 (98.95–99.98)





Age (SD) 16.6 (15.9–17.4) 14.5 (14.1–14.9)
Children aged 1–5 years 3,650 (45.9 %) 3,250 (48.1 %)
Female 4,656 (57.9 %) 4,067 (59.0 %)
RDT, rapid diagnostic test; SD, standard deviation
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comparison facilities (67 % reduction compared to 50 %
reduction in raw proportion, ratio of adjusted OR =
0.45, 95 % CI: 0.28–0.74).
Malaria-negative children under 5 years of age were
more likely to get AL than malaria-negative adults in both
arms and the odds of a malaria-negative child receiving
AL was even higher when diagnosed by microscopy com-
pared to RDT (adjusted OR = 0.77, 95 % CI: 0.60–0.99;
Additional file 3).
At baseline and endline, there was no significant dif-
ference in prescription practices to malaria-confirmed
cases between the intervention and comparison groups.
AL dispensed to laboratory-confirmed malaria cases im-
proved slightly, but not significantly, in both arms by the
fourth quarter of the study.
The rate of prescription to patients without a test was
evaluated at the cluster level. The percent of AL given to
patients without a test was 25.7 % in the intervention
arm at the end of the study compared to 40.3 % in the
control arm. After adjusting for transmission zone and
volume of patients seen at a facility, the rate of AL pre-
scriptions to patients without a test was 5-fold lower in
the intervention arm (Incidence rate ratio (IRR) = 0.18,
95 % CI: 0.07–0.48; Table 4).
Intervention outcome
The maximum amount that could be earned by an inter-
vention facility over the 1-year study period was 400,000
KSh (approximately $5,000 USD). The mean quarterly
amount earned was $668 USD, approximately half of the
total possible amount. There was considerable variation
between facilities in the amount earned, indicating that in-
dividual facility characteristics or context were important
(by ANOVA, 78 % of variance is explained by between-
facility variation and 22 % within-facility, across quarters).
The indicator for which intervention facilities showed
the most improvement was the percent of malaria-negative
patients who received AL (22.4 % at baseline down to
Table 3 Mixed-effects logistic regression of AL use by malaria status in quarter 4 compared to baseline. Comparison of AL treatment
in intervention and control arm for all patients and by sub-group (transmission zone, age group)
Raw proportion
Endpoint Comparison Intervention
Clusters Baseline Quarter 4 Clusters Baseline Quarter 4 Unadjusted OR Adjusted OR ICC (95 % CI)
(95 % CI) (95 % CI)a
Malaria-negative patients receiving AL
All ages 8 0.16 0.11 9 0.22 0.07 0.34 0.36 0.140
(0.24–0.53) (0.24–0.57) (0.073–0.252)
Aged 1–5 years 8 0.20 0.12 9 0.27 0.10 0.43 0.48 0.135
(0.24–0.79) (0.25–0.86) (0.063–0.262)
Aged 6 years and over 8 0.14 0.10 9 0.19 0.05 0.28 0.27 0.159
(0.15–0.52) (0.15–0.52) (0.081–0.288)
High transmission 4 0.32 0.18 5 0.36 0.12 0.41 0.45 0.109
(0.25–0.67) (0.28–0.74) (0.045–0.241)
Low transmission 4 0.06 0.02 4 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.112
(0.05–0.52) (0.05–0.56) (0.039–0.281)
Malaria-positive patients receiving AL
All ages 8 0.71 0.78 9 0.71 0.80 0.88 0.91 0.019
(0.46–1.69) (0.47–1.77) (0.007–0.054)
Aged 1–5 years 8 0.76 0.77 9 0.77 0.82 0.93 0.98 0.029
(0.35–2.49) (0.37–2.62) (0.008–0.101)
Aged 6 years and over 8 0.66 0.79 9 0.64 0.77 0.89 0.87 0.005
(0.36–2.18) (0.35–2.15) (0.0003–0.070)
High transmission 4 0.72 0.85 5 0.79 0.82 0.54 0.54 0.004
(0.23–1.27) (0.23–1.28) (0.0002–0.075)
Low transmission 4 0.71 0.62 4 0.59 0.54 1.10 1.16 0.028
(0.34–3.54) (0.36–3.78) (0.006–0.120)
aEstimates adjusted for quarter, age category (except for stratified analysis), gender, mode of diagnosis (RDT or microscopy), transmission zone (except for
stratified analysis) and average monthly volume of slides read in the facility in the preceding year. AL, artemether-lumefantrine; CI, confidence interval; ICC,
intracluster correlation; OR, odds ratio; RDT, rapid diagnostic test
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7.3 % in Q4; Table 5) and percent of patients given AL
without a malaria test (41 % down to 26 %). However,
the latter still remained high at approximately 26 %. La-
boratory performance indicators steadily improved each
quarter. Quarterly performance is also shown for the
comparison arm.
Twenty-seven and 39 % of incentive funds were spent
on laboratory equipment and patient equipment, respect-
ively, including microscopes, delivery beds, centrifuges,
steam sterilizers, biosafety cabinet, blood pressure cuffs
and minor surgical tools. Seven percent was used for facil-
ity repairs such as plumbing, electrical, fencing, security
grills and doors. Eleven percent was used for laboratory
reagents for urinalysis, blood grouping, blood sugar
testing, hemoglobin measurement and other medical
consumables.
Pre-study to post-study differences in clinical diagnosis
and AL prescription
Individual patient observations describing malaria testing
and treatment were not available prior to the study. There-
fore, to observe change in behavior before and after study
training (microscopy training and 1-day workshop to re-
view the malaria treatment guidelines with clinicians) com-
pared to the intervention period, we extracted monthly
facility-level data from the Kenya Health Information
System. The ratio of total monthly cases of malaria diag-
nosed clinically (without parasitological confirmation) to
total outpatients, and the ratio of AL courses dispensed to
total outpatients is averaged by quarter and plotted in
Fig. 2.
During the 6 months prior to training, about 20 % of
all patients in low transmission facilities were given a
clinical diagnosis of malaria and about 15 % of all patients
were given AL. After training, the proportion receiving
a clinical diagnosis of malaria declined by half, but the
proportion receiving AL changed only slightly. After
randomization to arms, the proportion of patients re-
ceiving AL dropped rapidly in the intervention arm, but
remained stable in the comparison arm for the first
6 months. A similar pattern is observed in high transmis-
sion: before the study, 40 % of patients received a clinical
diagnosis of malaria, but 60 % of all patients received AL.
AL prescription increased slightly in the 3-month period
between training and assignment to arms. Both clinical
diagnoses and AL prescription began to decline after the
start of the intervention period.
Overall, the training alone seems to have reduced the
proportion of patients assigned a clinical diagnosis of
malaria in low transmission facilities, but did not sub-
stantially change prescription practices in either zone,
indicating that AL was being prescribed to patients with
other diagnoses. It is only after the intervention began
that substantial changes in AL prescription are observed.
These numbers show general trends, but it should be
noted that they are presented as raw figures, not adjusted
for facility-level covariates. The ratio of clinically diag-
nosed patients will be dependent on availability of labora-
tory services (for example, some facilities have laboratory
services on the weekend while some do not), which may
not be balanced between arms. For the pre-defined study
endpoints, we were able to exclude individual dates when
Table 4 Effect of intervention on diagnostic testing prior to
treatment with AL
n = 174 IRR 95 % CI
Intervention 0.179 0.067–0.478
Standardized patient volume 0.687 0.616–0.766
High transmission 0.021 0.011–0.040
CI, confidence interval; IRR, incidence rate ratio
Table 5 Quarterly performance of facilities for incentivized indicators
Facility Baseline Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4
Intervention
Mean incentive earned in USD $593.4 $726.5 $629.5 $724.9
(SD) (281.0) (311.3) (282.0) (332.9)
Percent malaria-negative patients given AL 22.4 % 15.8 % 15.0 % 12.0 % 7.3 %
Percent malaria-positive patients given AL 70.8 % 78.3 % 74.0 % 76.9 % 79.6 %
Percent of AL given without a test - 40.7 % 29.1 % 35.5 % 25.7 %
Sensitivity + Specificity - 151.8 173.9 182.9 185.8
Comparison
Percent malaria-negative patients given AL 16.3 % 11.6 % 11.7 % 6.5 % 10.9 %
Percent malaria-positive patients given AL 71.4 % 69.5 % 79.0 % 79.1 % 78.0 %
Percent of AL given without a test - 57.1 % 46.3 % 45.1 % 40.3 %
Sensitivity + Specificity - 152.9 183.3 190.6 184.1
-, no baseline information available. AL, artemether-lumefantrine; SD, standard deviation
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Fig. 2 a Proportion of total patients attending a facility who received a clinical diagnosis of malaria and b proportion of total patients who received AL
before training, after training and after randomization to arms. Results are presented by quarter starting in January 2012 and stratified by transmission
zone and study arm
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laboratory services were not available, which we cannot
do for aggregated monthly data. Similarly, AL dispensing
depends heavily on the slide-positivity rate and the avail-
ability of AL, which also may not be balanced between
arms. Prior to the study initiation, there likely were
periodic stockouts of AL. Finally, routine monthly report-
ing data is subject to high rates of missingness.
Discussion
Results from a cluster randomized study of performance-
based incentives in rural government health facilities shows
significant improvement in management of suspected
malaria fevers over the study period in response to incen-
tives. We observed important and significant improvements
in rates of malaria testing prior to treatment and reduction
in over-prescription of AL to non-malaria fevers. The
reduction in AL prescriptions to malaria-negative patients
was observed to some degree in both groups, but the
intervention group showed more than a 2.5-fold greater
reduction in odds of dispensing AL to slide-negative pa-
tients than the comparison group by the final quarter.
The effect of the intervention on AL overuse was pri-
marily observed in the final quarter and there are several
possible reasons for the delayed impact of incentives. First,
the relatively short intervention period (1 year) may have
hindered our ability to measure a steady-state effect of the
incentives. Second, it is possible that it took some time for
the facilities to understand how to maximize their incen-
tives or to appreciate the additional resources available.
Finally, it is also possible that in a system with high staff
turnover, providers may be less motivated by facility-based
incentives if they anticipate being transferred and are not
able to benefit from additional resources to the facility.
The percent of negative patients receiving AL at base-
line was lower than expected based on previous studies
and may have reduced our ability to measure an earlier
impact of incentives. As a result, the absolute difference
between the arms at the end of the study was small (3.6
percentage points), although the percent improvement
(67 % in the intervention arm) would be remarkable if
reproducible at higher starting levels of over-dispensing
of AL. We considered whether the pre-intervention train-
ing contributed to low AL prescription to malaria-negative
cases at baseline. However, recently published nationwide
surveys show AL prescription rates of approximately 15 %
to malaria-negative patients, which is consistent with our
observations at baseline [31]. In addition, Mbacham et al.
[32] showed no effect of a 1-day basic training on any
aspect of malaria case management 3–6 months after
training. Finally, analysis of monthly reports from study
facilities before and after training suggests little or no
impact of training on clinically diagnosed malaria and
AL prescription. Therefore, the impact of pre-study
training on the outcome was likely small. If there was
an early effect of training on AL prescription in the first
few months, the intervention could have been responsible
for maintaining and enhancing those improvements in the
intervention arm as comparison facilities lost momentum
and returned to status quo. This would also explain the
larger difference between the arms toward the end of the
study period.
Another possible factor contributing to initial improve-
ment in both arms may have been the monthly visits to
each facility, which could have reinforced the training. A
similar effect was seen in a recent trial in Tanzania that
measured the impact of RDTs and training on antimalarial
prescription [33]. They also saw that overuse of antimalar-
ials remained very low in the control arm throughout the
1-year intervention period, probably reflecting the com-
bination of training plus regular supervision. Although
our study was not designed to separately measure the ef-
fect of supervision, this distinction may not be relevant
since such a program would not be implemented in the
absence of similar supervision structure. The effect of the
incentive in isolation of the associated framework may not
be meaningful. Because of the cluster randomized con-
trolled design, we can confidently attribute the excess im-
provement in the intervention arm to the incentives.
There was no effect of the intervention on prescription
of AL to malaria-positive patients. Other studies of mal-
aria prescription practice have recorded similar low rates
of prescription of first-line antimalarials to confirmed
malaria cases [31, 34], which persisted under other inter-
vention strategies [32, 33]. The reasons for this are not
entirely clear and a better understanding of clinical deci-
sion making for confirmed malaria cases is required.
Pay for performance programs have shown mixed re-
sults, particularly in health systems of developing coun-
tries [23, 35]. Similar to our study, a pilot program in
Uganda showed parallel improvement in incentive and
non-incentive groups [36]. They pointed to contextual
factors that may have undermined the extrinsic motivation
provided by the incentives. During our intervention period,
the Ministry of Health removed user fees from all periph-
eral health facilities, including laboratory fees. Although
there were no stockouts of AL in study facilities, they
struggled under increased patient volume and lack of user
fees to replenish supplies. The overall situation eroded
morale and may have reduced the impact of extrinsic
motivation. Some laboratories simply could not keep up
with the number of patients, which could explain why
30–40 % of AL was dispensed to patients without a la-
boratory test.
The fact that our study relied solely on routine record
keeping at the facility is both a strength and a weakness.
Using routine government-issued tools ensured that we
were measuring behavior within the normal practice and
there was no added burden of record keeping and no
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excessive observer effect that is present with exit inter-
views. Unfortunately, we found record keeping to be in-
complete at some facilities, particularly in the pharmacy,
which is often staffed by an untrained casual worker.
This may be responsible for the unexpectedly low observed
prescription rates to slide-positive patients. However, this
was not a systematic bias (that is, affecting the intervention
more than the comparison arm, or negative patients more
than positive patients) and so is not likely to have biased
our results. Low observed prescription rates to malaria-
positive patients also suggests that gaming or data manipu-
lation was not an issue in our study. Facilities would have
had to orchestrate a high degree of collusion across several
departments at the level of the individual patient records
in order to artificially elevate their performance. If they had
done so, we would likely have seen larger differences
between the arms.
It is interesting to compare the present study to other
behavior change interventions to improve health care or
health outcomes. Previous studies have shown that train-
ing alone has not generally been successful in changing
malaria prescription practices even when coupled with
the introduction of RDTs [32, 37, 38]. In contrast, innova-
tive training methods can improve adherence to the results
of malaria diagnostic testing, particularly for malaria-
negative patients [32, 33]. This study provides evidence
for an additional tool that can improve rational anti-
malarial use in the formal health sector. More broadly,
our incentive strategy shows improvements similar in
magnitude to other behavior change strategies such as
opinion leaders (median absolute risk difference of 12 %
for a broad range of health care outcomes [39] compared
to a 9 % absolute risk difference in our study; Additional
file 2) and audit and feedback (median absolute risk differ-
ence of 4 % [40]).
This is not a study of implementing P4P as a means of
instigating sweeping reforms in the health system or
health financing. We focused on a specific (although sig-
nificant) problem and designed our incentives to impact
that one area of concern. Our study only included govern-
ment facilities, as these were the only facilities eligible for
quarterly financing through the HSSF. In the relatively
rural areas of our study, very few private health facilities
exist, especially those with diagnostic capacity. Therefore,
this criterion did not exclude many eligible facilities.
However, we speculate that inclusion of private for-profit
clinics in a facility-based incentive program might show
even better results than in government facilities, since
such facilities are profit-driven and may be highly moti-
vated by the opportunity to earn additional resources
that could be invested in their business. Although all of
our study facilities had the capacity for microscopic
diagnosis of malaria, implementation of RDT diagnosis
could greatly expand the scope of facilities eligible to
benefit from such a program. However, it has been ob-
served that incentive programs are less successful when
health care workers do not feel that they have the tools
necessary to achieve their targets. If supplies of RDTs
are erratic, this could seriously undermine the extrinsic
motivation intended within an incentive scheme.
This work adds to the current literature in several im-
portant dimensions across multiple disciplines. First, it
contributes new knowledge in the area of performance-
based incentives, an area that has generated much interest
but suffers from a lack of rigorous evidence in developing
countries. It is the only study of which we are aware that
has a truly experimental design for testing P4P incentives
in sub-Saharan Africa. Our pay for performance program
was also novel in two important respects. We focused on
quality of care rather than volume of services and we used
facility-directed rather than provider-directed incentives.
Second, ours is a completely new approach to tackling the
problem of overuse of antimalarials and improving mal-
aria case management. Other studies have tested training
interventions, introduction of new diagnostic tools and
community education to improve adherence to the WHO
policy of parasitological diagnosis before treatment, but
this is the first report of using incentives to improve
adherence to the policy. Finally, the results can inform
quality improvement and behavior change interventions
in health care delivery more broadly.
Conclusions
This is the first experimental evidence of the impact of
pay for performance incentives in sub-Saharan Africa.
We demonstrate that facility-based incentives, rather than
personal incentives paid to providers, were able to pro-
mote behavior change. This is particularly important in
a resource-constrained system, since a facility-based ap-
proach allows funds to be re-invested in health infra-
structure and enhances the sustainability and benefit to
the patients. We observed that intervention facilities
invested in infrastructure and significantly improved or
expanded the services they were able to provide. In
addition, the monetary value of the incentives in our
program was designed to be offset by the money saved
through reduced wastage of expensive ACTs.
Our study contributes to the small but growing body
of evidence describing the usefulness and limitations of
performance-based incentives in developing countries. It
suggests that institutional incentives may provide extrin-
sic motivation for behavior change and enhance or sus-
tain the effects of training, but this change may occur
relatively slowly. A deeper understanding is required of
the trade-offs between institutional incentives that may
enhance health care infrastructure and service delivery
versus individual incentives that may produce larger re-
sults in a shorter time period.
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Endnotes
1The facilities included in our study are located in
what are now known as Busia County, Bungoma County,
Uasin Gishu County, Elgeyo Marakwet County and
Baringo County
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